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Investment decisions in influenza pandemic
contingency planning: cost-effectiveness of
stockpiling antiviral drugs
Anna K. Lugne´r1, Maarten J. Postma2
Background: The threat of an influenza pandemic has led to stockpiling of antiviral drugs in order to
mitigate a plausible outbreak. If the stockpile would be used in relation to the recent pandemic alert, an
investment decision about renewing the stock for a possible subsequent pandemic is essential. The
decision should include cost-effectiveness considerations. Methods: We constructed a cost-effectiveness
analysis in the Dutch context, explicitly including risk of an outbreak. Outcomes from a dynamic
transmission model, comparing an intervention with a non-intervention scenario, were input in our
health economic calculations. Results: Stockpiling was cost-effective from the health-care perspective if
the actual risk is 37% for 30 years. If less than 60% of the population would take the antiviral drugs or
the attack rate is about 50%, the investment would not be cost-effective from this perspective.
Conclusion: Risk perception, realistic coverage among population and size of a pandemic are crucial
parameters and highly decisive for the investment decision.
Keywords: cost-effectiveness, dynamic model, infectious diseases, influenza pandemic, mathematical
modelling.
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Introduction
In 1918–19, an influenza pandemic hit the world in threewaves. Mainly, the second wave led to exceptionally
elevated loss of lives, with the unique pattern involving the
highest case fatality among the otherwise healthy young
population (20–40 years of age).1,2 Without all details about
the origin of the virus yet (or ever) being known, the A(H1N1)
virus from the 1918 pandemic has been shown to be a distantly
related avian virus. The viruses causing two later pandemics
(the Asian flu in 1957–58 and the Hong Kong flu in 1968–69)
were both related to the 1918-pandemic virus but with
substantially lower case fatality rates.1
The cross-species transmission to humans of the avian
influenza A(H5N1), circulating among wild and domesticated
birds for a few years now has already raised concern about the
possible occurrence of another influenza pandemic, should this
virus acquire human-to-human transmission abilities. Another
virus has recently raised additional concern about such a
pandemic. In particular, by the end of April 2009 the World
Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza
pandemic alert to phase five (out of six) due to the recent
spread of the new influenza virus A(H1N1). Daily details of
the outbreak can be found on the website of WHO.3
One strategy to minimize the consequences of a pandemic
for public health and the economy is to mitigate the spread
and the health consequences by therapeutic treatment with
anti-viral (AV) drugs, advocated amongst others by the
Dutch authorities.4 Stockpiling is necessary to be able to
provide the population with these drugs in sufficient
quantities and within time.5 Yet, such an investment raises the
question whether such large-scale stockpiling is cost-effective,
i.e. whether society’s scarce resources are efficiently spent.
There are only a few studies published yet that have
investigated the cost-effectiveness of stockpiling AV drugs.6–8
All of these calculations assume a clinical attack rate (CAR) of
25–30% and predict that there would be a pandemic within
30 years. These assumptions may be conceived as realistic, as
indeed three pandemics were seen during the last 100 years, all
with CARs in the same order of magnitude.9 Yet, of course
exact occurrences in the future remain inherently uncertain.
One aspect of AV therapy is the impact on the transmission
of influenza. This can only be adequately modelled with a
dynamic model, taking the force of infection explicitly into
account. With such a model, the effect of AV therapy and
other containment methods on the CAR can be estimated in
detail and changing over time.10–16 One of these included costs
for stockpiling, showing that this strategy would be cost-
effective for the United States at a relatively high predicted
CAR of 50%.16
Influenza pandemics are a continuous threat to public
health. As long as there is no strain-specific, or universal
vaccine against pandemic influenza, the question whether to
stockpile AV drugs remains relevant. This certainly includes
the cost-effectiveness aspect which requires regular updating,
especially when new information about the seriousness of an
infection becomes available.
The aim of this study is to estimate whether stockpiling of
AV drugs is cost-effective for therapeutic use in the
Netherlands, explicitly taking both a perceived risk of an
influenza pandemic and multiple stock turnovers into
account. The calculations of the effect of the therapy are
based on a dynamic transmission model enabling sensitivity
analyses on the effects of alternative CARs and percentages of
the population receiving AV therapy on transmission and cost-
effectiveness.
Methods
Time perspective of the analysis and risk
of pandemic
We choose a time horizon of 30 years for our model design.
A 30-year horizon reflects an inter-pandemic period based on
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the three influenza pandemics that occurred during the 20th
century. This implies that on average a stock would have to
be kept for 30 years. Also, the earlier analyses of stockpiling
are mostly based on the assumption of an average yearly risk
of a pandemic as 3% (3 pandemics in 100 years). Assuming
that the risk of a pandemic is independent of the previous
year, the probability of it occurring during a specified time
interval can be approximated by a Poisson distribution; we
refer to this as the observed risk. According to the
assumption of an annual risk of 3%, the estimated risk that
there would be at least one pandemic during the 30-year
period that was modelled would be 59%, with a predicted
risk of one, two and three outbreaks at 37, 16 and 5%,
respectively.
The stock turnover depends on stock composition, the shelf
life of the drugs stored and on the time horizon of the analysis.
The exact shelf life of the stock-piled AV drugs depends on
how they are stored. One option is to use bulk powder
oseltamivir, a neuraminidase inhibitor with an expected shelf
life of ten years. Another option is to stockpile ready-to-use
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) tablets, with a more limited shelf life of
five years. In particular, two stockpiling options are
investigated in this analysis: (i) as bulk powder (oseltamivir
alone) and (ii) as a combination of two-third of bulk powder
and one-third of Tamiflu (combination oseltamivir and
Tamiflu). The combination option is the one previously
chosen in the Netherlands, and has already been stockpiled.
Currently, the stock consists of five million doses. Over a
30-year horizon, the stock of Tamiflu would have to be
renewed four times, whereas the oseltamivir has to be
renewed two times after the first investment.
Costs of treatment and stockpiling
Health-care utilization, sick leave and deaths were estimated
for both the non-intervention and the intervention scenario
and subsequently compared in an incremental cost-effectiveness
analysis, based on a dynamic transmission model.17 In the
intervention scenario, individuals with influenza symptoms
were therapeutically treated with AV drugs. Treatment was
assumed to start within 48 h of the onset of symptoms,
leading to a 50% reduction of health-care resource use due
to complications, and a 50% reduction in deaths.18,19
Outpatient health-care utilization was based on opinions
from an expert panel.20
Direct health-care costs that occur during a pandemic
include telephone contact with an outpatient health-care
centre or general practitioner (GP) for a prescription of
the AV drug. Cost savings were expected in treatment
with AV drugs, concerning less GP visits, antibiotics
treatments of complications, costs for over-the-counter
(OTC) medications and costs for hospitalizations due to
severe complications of influenza. To reflect a societal
perspective, productivity losses were included. These were
estimated according to the Dutch guidelines using the
friction-costing method, an alternative to the human capital
method21,22 (table 1).
Next to the purchase costs, the stockpiling costs and
opportunity costs were included. Costs for storing included
heating/cooling of the storage room, electricity, regular
inspection and control of the active substance and security
arrangements. These storing costs were modelled as equally
large annual payments. The stockpiling costs were calculated
over the full-time horizon of 30 years. By investing in a stock,
resources that could have been used for other purposes are tied
up. To reflect this opportunity cost, 4% of the investment cost
was added (purchase and storing costs). Unused, out-of-date
stock is wasted at no cost assumed.
Some of the costs had to be neglected due to lack of
information (e.g. costs for distribution of drugs to
pharmacies from the central storing location and costs of
dispensing the bulk powder into consumption doses).
Consequently, the costs for the AV drugs could be slightly
underestimated. These costs were investigated in a targeted
Table 1 Data for use in cost-effectiveness analysis of stockpiling of AV drugs, base case analysis (30-year perspective), 80% of
population receive AV therapy
Non-intervention Intervention Incremental costs or LYG
Infected individuals 10 369 872 8 594056
Symptomatic individuals 6 221 923 5 156433
Hospitalizations 22 941 13 851
Deaths 9012 5362
Life-years lost (discounted) 96 795 57 912 38883
Costs health care
Outpatient GP visits E33240 996 E16529133 E16711 863
OTC drugs and antibiotics due to complications E37730 543 E29235472 E8495 071
Hospitalizations E108334 422 E65406635 E42927 786
Production losses
Production losses E2 521537242 E636309973 E1885 227269
Costs during pandemic
Telephone calls to GP E44077556 E44077556
Pharmacy fee for AV prescriptions E25867972 E25867972
Stockpiling costsa (5 million doses)
One time purchase, oseltamivir E45736179
One time purchase, combination Tamiflu and oseltamivir E56185269
Yearly storing costs E51389
30 years stockpiling, PV
Purchase and storing, oseltamivir E143658011
Purchase and storing, combination E176881136
Average PV: costs during pandemic E1085 347
Average PV: savings including productivity losses during pandemic E1130 112974
Average life-years gained 31594
Average quality adjusted life-years gained 48540
a: Assumption based on estimates from national experts involved in pandemic preparedness
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sensitivity analysis. All costs were expressed in euro rates of the
year 2007, costs were discounted with 4% and life-years gained
with 1.5%;21 ergo, the analysis was made from a societal
perspective including all relevant costs when available.
Transmission model
The virus transmission during an influenza pandemic was
estimated with a dynamic model. A detailed description of
the model and its parameters can be found in ref.17 In the
model shown in figure 1, individuals start as being susceptible
and upon infection they progress through a succession of
stages, including being infected but not infectious (latent),
being infected and infectious, recovered and immune
(removed). The model includes key epidemiological
parameters, such as contact rates among and within age
groups, the length of the infectious period and the probability
of transmission of the virus during a contact. The use of AV
drugs affected the recovery rate of patients and the mean
infectious time was assumed to be halved. At the start of the
first pandemic wave, the whole population was assumed to be
susceptible to infection with the virus. It was assumed in the
calculations that the pandemic virus behaves as a seasonal
influenza virus in the sense that risks of symptoms, illness
and death upon infection are similar to those risks observed
for seasonal influenza.
The basic reproduction number, or reproductive ratio R0,
reflects a key epidemiological variable that describes how many
secondary cases of infections are caused by one primary case in
a fully susceptible population (see e.g. Keeling and Rohani23).
The estimate of R0 used in the model at 1.73, was based on data
from the Asian Flu in 1957.24 Of all infected individuals, 60%
were assumed to develop clinical symptoms.25,26 In the base-
case non-intervention scenario the CAR predicted by the
dynamic model equals 38%.
Cost-effectiveness ratio
Costs for renewal of the stock were included for the total
period irrespective of the occurrence of an outbreak. The
costs for the AV drugs and the savings due to the intervention
(less health care costs due to less complications and less
production losses due to less illness) as well as the health
gains in terms of life-years gained (LYG), occur only when
the pandemic occurs.
The annual and stock renewal costs (including alternative
costs) were discounted and summed up to a present value
(PV). Likewise, the costs of the AV drugs, the cost savings
due to the intervention and the LYGs were discounted. Since
we do not know in which year after the stockpiling investment
a pandemic would exactly occur, costs, savings and LYGs
were calculated as an average of the yearly discounted value
during the 30-year time perspective. The net costs and LYG
during an outbreak due to intervention are dependent on the
perceived risk of an outbreak. The expected cost-effectiveness
ratio is calculated as (assuming a risk of a pandemic larger
than zero):
Expected cost-effectiveness =
PV of purchase and storing costs-
Risk  Average PV of net costs if pandemic
Risk  Average PV of LYG if pandemic
In the Netherlands, there is no official threshold below which
a cost-effectiveness ratio is considered acceptable. However,
E20 000 per LYG is often indicated as a possibility for such a
threshold. In this article, we refer to this amount as threshold
for acceptable cost-effectiveness and explicitly investigate the
expected cost-effectiveness in relation to the threshold and
depending on the risk of a pandemic to occur.
Sensitivity analysis
Epidemiological and distributional uncertainties were
elaborated in several one-way sensitivity analyses estimating
the cost-effectiveness for (i) size of pandemic with CAR of
25 and 50% (corresponding to R0 1.37 and 2.44,
respectively17); (ii) lower percentage of the population
receiving AV therapy, 60% instead of the policy goal of 80%.
In these cases, the stock size is adjusted to equal expected
number of symptomatic individuals; (iii) keeping the stock
fixed (sufficient for five million cases) but with a CAR of
25%; (iv) using quality adjusted life-years (QALY) gained.
The health-related quality of life (HRQoL) of patients with
influenza treated with oseltamivir (HRQoL weight 0.65)
compared with patients receiving placebo (HRQoL weight
0.61) were used.27 All clinical cases in the non-intervention
scenario were assigned a weight of untreated illness (0.61).
Non-treated individuals in the intervention scenario were
assumed to have less severe illness and assigned the same
HRQoL weight as for treated individuals (0.65); (v) possibly,
there could be two pandemic outbreaks during a time
perspective of 30 years. The observed risk of this would be
16% according to the Poisson distribution. Adding an extra
refill of the stock (an average of the PV of the purchase cost) in
combination with two times higher costs and savings due to a
pandemic and a two times extra gain in life-years illustrates
this; (vi) the cost of distribution and dispense of the drugs was
investigated.
Results
Based on the Dutch population data (16.6 million people in
2007), there would be 10.4 million infected individuals if a
pandemic was left uncontrolled. The policy goal in the
Netherlands is that 80% of individuals with symptoms will
use AV drugs, implying that there would be 8.6 million
infected cases of which 60% would have symptoms, resulting
in about 5 million individuals receiving AV drugs.
The stockpiling of oseltamivir alone is cost-effective if the












Figure 1 Schematic illustration of the dynamic model.  is the rate of becoming infected (force of infection),  the rate of
becoming infectious,  the rate of losing infectiousness,  rate of recovery or death. Source: Lugne´r et al.17
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than 23% in the next 30 years. If the stock is a combination of
oseltamivir and Tamiflu, the perceived risk cut-off point
would have to be a little larger (29%). Including production
losses shows that the risk would have to be larger than 9% for
the oseltamivir alone and 11% for the combination alternative
(figure 2). The observed risk that there will be one pandemic
during the 30 years is indicated with the horizontal lines in
figure 2. This observed risk is higher than the risk cut-off point
for the perceived risk. The interpretation is that along with
the observed risk, the stock-piling would be cost-effective.
The cost-effectiveness ratio for the combination alternative
at the observed risk would be around E15 000 per LYG
(including productivity losses is cost-saving).
In the health-care perspective there are a couple of cases
where stockpiling would not necessarily be cost-effective, as
shown in the sensitivity analyses (figure 2). For two cases the
cut-off cost-effectiveness point was equal to or higher than the
observed risk. If the CAR is as high as 50% (in this case we
assumed that the stock would cover to treat all symptomatic
cases), and if AV drugs would only be delivered to 60% of the
symptomatic individuals (instead of 80%), the stockpiling is
not cost-effective. Finally, calculations revealed that costs due
to distribution and dispensation could be up to E8 per dose at
a cost-effectiveness ratio of E20 000 at a risk of 37%.
Discussion
We show how the cost-effectiveness of stockpiling AV drugs
depends on the risk that there will be an outbreak of a
pandemic influenza. At one extreme, if there will be no
pandemic it would cost about 177 million to stockpile a
combination of AV drugs for 30 years. On the other, if for
sure there would be a pandemic outbreak the stockpiling
would be very cost-effective, with a cost-effectiveness ratio
below E6000 including production losses. We further show
that the results are sensitive to the size of a pandemic and
the proportion of the population that receives the AV drugs.
Is it realistic that 80% of the population will use the drug on
time? Is the spread of the pandemic similar to earlier influenza
epidemics, or could we expect a higher R0? Recent estimations
about the reproduction ratio based on data from the new
influenza A(H1N1) gives various estimates of 2.0–3.228 and
1.4–1.629 showing the large uncertainty about the actual
reproductive ratio in a new outbreak.
The model on which these calculations are based assumes
that the virus would continue to be sensitive to the AV
therapy. If resistance develops on a large scale and no
alternative, equally effective AV drug at a similar cost is
available to replace the current drug, this analysis would
have to be reconsidered. This strengthens the argument that
economic evaluations need to be reassessed when new
information is available. Especially, this applies to new or
better information about the characteristics of a pandemic
virus and effects of a possible vaccine. Furthermore, a recent
mathematical model showed that combining different AV
drugs could significantly reduce the resistance of a virus
against treatment and the attack rates of the pandemic.30
The recommendation to countries already holding a stock of
oseltamivir was to include a small stockpile (enough for 1% of
population) of a second AV drug. The costs for this extra stock
are suggested to be small.30 Using the official price31 to
estimate, the purchase cost of a zanamivir stock (another
neuraminidase inhibitor) for the Netherlands would cost
about E21 million for a one-time purchase. Stockpiling these
drugs for 30 years, assuming a shelf life of 5 years, would cost
about E90 million (discounted) including alternative costs.
These rough estimates show that the costs are not likely to
be negligible.
As pointed out by Beutels et al.,32 a health economic analysis
is a partial equilibrium model that does not take into account
all opportunity costs of treating symptomatic individuals
during a pandemic. In case there is a pandemic outbreak of
influenza, other health care procedures, mainly elective surgery
and non-acute treatments, should have to be postponed to free
up resources. For a more extensive economic evaluation, the
disutility of postponing surgery should also be incorporated,
measured as number of QALY lost.32 If current contingency
plans include postponing of elective surgery the question arises
if these plans would be changed during a pandemic if resource
would become available. The chance that AV therapy would
lead to less QALY lost among patients other than symptomatic
ones compared with patients with no AV treatment is, in our
opinion, likely to be very small, possibly even negligible. The
effects of postponed elective surgery would have little influence
on the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio and thus on our
specific analysis.
The uncertainties about when and if a pandemic would
manifest does not mean that an economic analysis of
Figure 2 Cost-effectiveness ratio E20 000 of stockpiling AV drugs depending on perceived risk of a pandemic outbreak, base
case and sensitivity analyses. Observed risk cut-off point indicated with horizontal line
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stockpiling either AV drugs or a vaccine is pointless: this
analysis anticipate that the cost-effectiveness ratio of
stockpiling a combination of AV drugs falls below the cost-
effectiveness cut-off point (including avoided production
losses due to treatment), if the risk of a pandemic during a
30-year period is about 11%. Currently, the new influenza
A(H1N1) is causing outbreaks around the world, possibly
adding another outbreak to the history of documented
influenza pandemics. Including this outbreak into the
calculus would raise the average annual risk to around 4%
(4/100). The resulting observed risk for at least one
pandemic for next 30 years would be higher (70%).
The beliefs about the risk and spread of a new influenza
virus causing a pandemic are very important in the decision
whether or not to invest in a stock of AV drugs or whenever
available, a vaccine.
Conflicts of interest: None declared.
Key points
 The beliefs about the risk of a new influenza virus
causing a pandemic are very important in the
decision whether or not to invest in a stock of AV
drugs.
 The cost-effectiveness of stockpiling is affected by the
coverage of AV therapy in the population since the
coverage influences the spread of the infection.
 Stockpiling is cost-effective also in cases of lower
coverage and higher attack rate when including
indirect costs in the calculations, but not necessarily
cost-saving.
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